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The Role of Case Complexity in Judicial Decision Making
A wide range of literature in political science emphasizes the centrality of ideology in explaining political elites' behavior. Studies of both Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have shown the ways that institutional constraints and norms can shape the opportunities for ideologically driven behavior, at both the agenda-setting stage (e.g., Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn 1999; Krehbiel and Rivers 1998) as well as the final decision stage (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 1993; Poole and Rosenthal 1991) . In studies of legislative behavior, ideology is viewed as a conscious, explicit motivation for individual behavior (Krehbiel 1993 (Krehbiel , 1998 , though not necessarily the only possible motivating factor (Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman 1999; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kingdon 1973) . This way of understanding ideology as an acceptable basis for political decision making reflects the values underlying elective office; namely, that because the electorate chooses legislators on the basis of their ideological positions on policy matters, it is then desirable for public officials to act in a manner consistent with their ideological position. i However, in the context of judicial institutions (and particularly the federal judiciary), there are strong norms opposing a conscious, explicit reliance on ideology as an appropriate basis for judicial decision making. Like the norms about acceptable legislative behavior, the norms about judicial actors also reflect the values underlying the selection mechanism used, which emphasizes independence and insulation from public opinion. In this paper, I move away from the debate over whether ideology should matter in judicial decision making and connect to a more recent segment of research that acknowledges two points. First, due to their legal education and professional socialization, legal decision makers believe that law matters, and this has consequences for how judges behave (Braman 2006; Baum 1997) , particularly in institutional contexts other than the U.S. Supreme Court. Second, this emerging body of 4 research acknowledges that it is vital to begin exploring the process by which ideological frames operate to influence legal decision making (i.e., asking, how ideology affects legal decision making, rather than, does ideology affect legal decision making).
Competing perspectives exist about how ideology functions in judicial decision making. Braman and Nelson (2007) characterize these approaches as either "top down" or "bottom up."
In the "top down" model (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 1993) , outcome decisions are made first and then affect which legal explanations are offered as a rationalization. In the "bottom up" model (Baum 1999; Rowland and Carp 1996) , judges' attitudes behave like "information filters [that affect] … micro-decisions that occur in the process of legal reasoning" (Braman and Nelson 2007, 942) .
I build on this literature by exploring the cognitive function that ideology plays in "noisy" decision-making environments. Specially, I examine the role of ideology for appellate judges in "complex" cases that raise many legal issues, compared to cases that present fewer dimensions.
The paper proceeds in the following manner. First, I discuss the major existing theoretical perspectives on the function of ideology in judicial decision making, highlighting differences in how ideology is defined in each. Next, I discuss how ideological frames might be used, unconsciously, to simplify judicial decision making under these conditions, and suggest several hypotheses. Testing these on a sample of published decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1982 to 2002, I find evidence that increased complexity is not associated with ideologically "sincere" voting for liberals, but that it is for conservative judges. I conclude by discussing the implications of my results for the "law versus ideology" debate about judging.
Ideology and Judicial Decision Making
Prominent models
The function of ideology is viewed quite differently by the prominent political science models of judging. In the attitudinal model articulated by Segal and Spaeth (1993, 2002) , ideology is the central explanatory factor for judicial decision making on the U.S. Supreme
Court. Under this account, judges make decisions based on their ideology: "the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices. Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative;
Marshall voted the way he did because he was extremely liberal" (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 86) .
Attitudinalist scholars use the word "ideology" interchangeably with several other terms: "policy preferences" (Rohde and Spaeth 1976) , "policy goals" (Klein 2002; Baum 1997) , "ideal points" (Schubert 1965 (Schubert , 1974 , "attitudes" (Segal and Spaeth 1993, 2002; Spaeth and Peterson 1971) , and "values" (Pritchett 1948) . As described by Harold Spaeth (1972) , the way ideology enters into the judicial decision-making process is a multi-step process. First, a judge must hold an attitude, defined as "an interrelated set of beliefs about an object or situation" (65). Judges will have attitudes about the parties involved in the case, as well as about the central legal issue in the case (Segal and Spaeth 2002) . When these attitudes interact, they will influence a judge's behavior.
ii The attitudinal model implies that ideology serves as a simplifying mechanism in decision making: when judges possess attitudes about the parties and the legal issue in the case, the range of possible outcomes is constrained. Characterizations of the attitudinal model sometimes assume that this is a conscious process-what Gillman (2001) refers to as "low politics"-though Segal and Spaeth appear to be agnostic on whether judges are fully aware of this tendency (Baum 2009 ), focusing less on how this mechanism works than on whether the evidence is consistent with decisions based on policy preferences.
iii In contrast, empirical work that employs the "legal model" de-emphasizes the role of ideology in decision making, instead focusing on legal variables, such as precedent (Kritzer and Richards 2003; Richards and Kritzer 2002) , statutes (Cook 1977) , doctrinal cues (George and Epstein 1992) , and fact patterns (Segal 1984) . iv Another branch of scholarship classified under the rubric of the "legal model" comes from legal professionals and law school faculty and is typically (though not always) distinct from empirical scholarship in taking a strong normative position that judges can and should avoid relying on ideology in any way in their decisions. A common criticism of such work is that it does not yield testable propositions (Cross 1997; Smith 1994; Segal and Spaeth 1993) .
Finally, strategic models argue that judges possess multiple goals, one of which is to achieve their preferred policy outcome. Under the strategic model, ideology is said to matter within constraints, but perhaps more importantly, it posits a conscious recognition of attitudes and reliance on them in decision making. For instance, Epstein and Knight (1998) refer to judges as "policy seekers" and note that individual judges have been quoted saying that they think they can influence public policy.
In two of these three major approaches, then, ideology plays a prominent role in explaining judicial decisions. However, the specific causal mechanism by which ideology works to affect judicial decisions remains poorly understood. In the section that follows, I discuss what we know about the role of ideology in cognition and how that knowledge might strengthen our accounts of judicial decision making.
Ideology and Cognition
Research in political psychology has generally characterized ideology as a coherent organizing framework for understanding the world (Converse 1964 ) that, at least in part, reflects individuals' psychological needs (Jost et al. 2003) . v Several insights from this literature have immediate relevance for our inquiry into the bases of judicial decision making. First, one common perspective on ideology's role in cognition is that ideology can serve as a heuristic device, providing a cognitive "shortcut" when time and informational resources are scarce.
Under this view, ideology's role in decision making is likely to go unnoticed by the decision maker -that is, the decision maker unconsciously relies upon his or her own ideology as a guide.
Related to this perspective is research that finds an effect for ideology in evaluating the credibility of sources; for example, conservative individuals are more likely to accept information from a conservative source as reliable than they would if they associated the information as coming from a liberal source, and vice versa (Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman 2005; Lupia 2002 ).
Additionally, an individual's ideological position may be associated with a particular cognitive style in terms of the differentiation between and integration of concepts (Tetlock 1983) . A robust debate persists between scholars who argue that cognitive simplicity is associated primarily with conservatism (Sidanius 1985 (Sidanius , 1988 Tetlock 1983 Tetlock , 1984 and those who argue for a more symmetrical relationship between ideological extremity and cognitive simplicity (Ray 1973; Rokeach 1960; Shils 1954) . However, more recent work has tended to find more support consistent with the "rigidity of the right" hypothesis (Altemeyer 1998 ; but see Gruenfeld 1995) . Overall, what unites this body of literature is the premise that ideology is an 8 important, and perhaps unavoidable, factor in influencing the content and manner of decision making.
In contrast, some legal scholars have argued that that judges' professional training "inoculates" them from the cognitive phenomena observed by psychologists in studies of nonjudges' decision making (Schauer 2007 ; but see Spellman 2007) . This is no doubt due to the strong norm in legal education against relying upon ideology as a basis for legal decisions.
However, research using law students and magistrate judges as experimental subjects suggests that neither law school training nor practicing the law may be enough to overcome common cognitive errors, or to make ideology entirely irrelevant (Braman and Nelson 2007; Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2001 of satisfaction with the job. I feel dirty at the end of the day, having made many decisions without time for proper reflection and analysis" (Robel 1990 ). Another lamented: "It's huge.
It's absolutely huge. And it does affect the way you work. Because when I was working on 10-12 cases a month, it was far different than working on 30-40 cases. You have to give priority to certain cases; you're always behind." ix Indeed, psychological research on group decision making suggests that stress can cause more simplified, heuristic-based decision making (Karau and Kelly 1992).
In the empirical scholarship focusing specifically on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the relationship between case complexity, ideology, and judicial behavior has not been directly addressed. Rather, when complexity has been considered, it has been as a control variable. For example, Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek (2006) use two measures as proxies for complexity in their study of dissensus on appellate panels: the presence of a cross appeal and the number of headnotes coded in the Songer (2002) database.
x They find that the number of legal issues, as indicated by the latter measure, is positively related to the likelihood of a concurrence, compared to joining the majority opinion, but is not related to the likelihood of a dissent. Other work (Lindquist, Martinek, and Hettinger 2007) finds that case complexity (as measured by a factor analysis of legal issues and opinion length) is a significant predictor of decisions to affirm in part and reverse in part ("mixed" outcomes). Taken together, these results suggest that as cases present more dimensions, judges are more likely to respond with fewer clear-cut decisions (i.e., separate opinions and split decisions).
While, overall, the literature on ideology and cognition does not provide a clear set of expectations about the effects of judicial ideology in complex cases, it is possible to draw a few general conclusions from the extent research. First, context is important, particularly in terms of decision making under stressful conditions. It is reasonable to assume that, given the heavy caseloads faced by appellate panels, unconscious reliance on heuristics is probably a common response to that decision environment. Second, ideology operates differently for individuals at different points in the ideological spectrum. This can be seen both in the political psychology literature and in work specifically examining federal appellate judges (Randazzo, Waterman, and Fine 2006) . Building on these insights, in the section that follows, I lay out several hypotheses to test the competing contentions suggested by the literature.
Theoretical Expectations
The central assumption underlying this inquiry is that we should not expect ideology to have a uniform effect across all judges or all cases. If we imagine that ideology functions like a filter, it should simplify the decision making process by guiding judges as they prioritize different pieces of information. As more and more pieces of information flow into that filter, two responses are possible. Because of the stress associated with greater levels of complexity, ideology could become an even more influential heuristic, triggering more ideologically consistent voting as response to uncertainty (Karau and Kelly 1992). Alternatively, as complexity rises, it is possible that too many pieces of information would overwhelm an ideological framework, rendering it less meaningful as a filter and producing less ideologically consistent voting behavior. Each of these competing explanations is represented in the two hypotheses below.
Hypothesis 1:
In cases with multiple issues, ideology will exert a stronger effect on a judge's vote than in cases with a single issue.
Hypothesis 2:
In cases with multiple issues, ideology will exert a weaker effect on a judge's vote than in cases with a single issue.
In addition, the political psychology literature gives us reason to question whether ideology performs an equivalent function for ideologically extreme judges (both liberal and conservative) as well as those who are moderate. Past research on political elites offers mixed conclusions. In early studies examining U.S. senators and Supreme Court justices, Tetlock (1983) and Tetlock et al. (1985) found that liberal and moderate political elites exhibited more integrative complexity in their written and spoken rhetoric than conservatives. However, a more recent examination of the Supreme Court (Gruenfeld 1995) found that this difference between liberals and conservatives was an artifact of majority opinion status, not purely ideology.
Finally, one recent study of the Courts of Appeals found ideological differences in which substantive areas of statutory law constrain judges, again suggesting that the function of ideology may differ depending on one's ideological position (Randazzo, Waterman, and Fine 2006) . The same study also found that ideological extremity was only associated with sincere voting by Republican appointees, but not Democratic appointees.
To further examine whether ideology mediates the relationship between complexity and sincere voting, I also introduce competing hypotheses that test whether any conditional relationship is symmetrical or asymmetrical.
Hypothesis 3:
In cases with multiple issues, judges with strong conservative preferences will be more likely to cast sincere votes than judges with strong liberal preferences.
Hypothesis 4:
In cases with multiple issues, judges with more extreme ideological positions will be more likely to cast sincere votes than moderate judges will in such cases.
Data and Methods
The data used for these analyses are derived from the Multi-User Database on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, transformed so that a judge-vote was the unit of analysis (Songer 1997; Kuersten and Haire 2006) for the eleven numbered circuits for the years 1982 to 2002. After excluding cases in which no legal issues were coded, this yielded a total of 11,392 judge-votes for analysis, all of which came from three-judge panels.
To untangle the relationship between complexity and ideological voting, the dependent variable in the analysis predicts the likelihood of a judge casting a "sincere" vote. 
Independent Variables
In order to evaluate the relationship between complexity and ideologically sincere voting, it is important to control for judicial ideology. A continuous variable is superior to a dichotomous approach because it allows for a more precise and nuanced measure as well as allowing distinctions to be made between ideological extremes and moderates (Epstein, Martin, Segal, and Westerland 2007) . For these reasons, I use the Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers (2001) ideology scores, which range from -1 (most liberal) to +1 (most conservative) and reflect the transformed the raw number by taking its square root, which changes the range to run from 1 to 3.6. I also included a dummy variable to control for the presence of a cross appeal, which by definition, raises multiple issues, since both parties are appealing separate issues from the district court's decision (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006) . Cross Appeal and Legal Complexity tap into different aspects of multiple issues, as evidence by their low correlation (r = .09).
To gauge whether the effect of ideology on sincere voting is conditioned by complexity, I
included two interaction terms. The first, Ideology*Legal Complexity, examines whether differences exist between liberal and conservative judges in how case complexity conditions their vote. The second multiplicative term, Extreme*Legal Complexity, tests whether differences exist between ideological moderates and extremes with respect to this conditional relationship.
Additionally, I include several control variables. I control for the participation of the U.S. government, which retains a strong advantage in litigation (Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 1999) . The variable U.S. government takes the value of -1 if the United States is a party and takes the position contrary to the judge's preferences, zero if the United States is not a party in the case, and +1 if the United States is involved and takes a position that is consistent with a judge's "sincere" position. To account for the court's overwhelming tendency to affirm lower courts' decisions, Lower Court is equal to one if the district court ruled in the direction consistent with the judge's preferences, and equal to zero if it ruled in the opposing direction. Finally, because a judge's propensity to cast a "sincere" vote may be a function of the ideological positions of his or her colleagues on the panel, I created a variable that is the absolute value of the distance between the majority opinion author and the panel median (Panel Distance).
[ Table 1 about here] values, moving from being in the minority coalition to the majority coalition within the circuit increases the probability of a sincere vote from .36 to .51.
Findings
[ Figure 1 about here]
In the second column of Figure 1 shows the conditional effect of legal complexity on ideology for both liberal and conservative judges. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the probability of a sincere vote increases somewhat for all judges as the number of issues in a case rises. This allows us to reject Hypothesis 2 (which predicted the opposite result). Additionally, Figure 1 clearly shows that conservative judges are significantly more likely to cast a sincere vote than liberal judges, supporting Hypothesis 3. Over the range of legal issues, the probability for conservative judges increases from .62 to .65, while the probability for liberal judges increases from .35 to .39. At the highest levels of complexity (3.4 and higher), however, there are no meaningful differences between conservative and liberal judges. In the third column of results in Table 1 [ Table 2 about here]
Finally, we examine the possibility that the findings are an artifact of the type of case (civil or criminal) being heard. Since a large portion of the appellate docket is made up by criminal cases, which are typically affirmed at a higher rate than other types of cases (Lindquist 2007), one possible explanation for the findings above is that conservative judges' greater propensity to vote sincerely is being driven by case type. other, non-significant interaction terms omitted because of space). Consequently, it does not appear that the results for the conditional effect of complexity on ideology that we saw above are being driven by outcomes in criminal cases.
[ Figure 3 about here]
In sum, we can draw several conclusions from these findings. First, as shown in Figure   1 , we find evidence that ideology has a stronger influence as a case contains more issues, though the effect is not overwhelming. This suggests that ideology can be a somewhat effective filter in simplifying the decision environment as it becomes more "crowded" with information.
In addition, Figure 1 shows that differences exist between liberal and conservative judges with respect to the general propensity for casting ideologically sincere votes, and that these differences are not a function of ideological extremism. Specifically, conservative judges are more likely to cast sincere votes across the board and are increasingly likely to do so as a case becomes more complex. This provides some tentative support for the work of some political psychologists (see Jost et al. 2003a for an overview), who have argued that conservatism is composed of a number of underlying traits (e.g., intolerance of ambiguity and the need for order, structure, and closure) that are associated with eliminating nuance and simplifying complex phenomena. Obviously, the normative implications of these studies are quite controversial (see Greenberg and Jonas 2003; Jost et al. 2003b ), but given the results shown here, we can at least say that conservatism appears to help conservative judges make ideologically consistent decisions in the midst of "noisy" decision environments. Liberal judges, too, rely more on their ideology as cases become more complex, but their ideological position does not yield nearly as 20 large an effect, predicting a sincere vote only about one-third of the time. This difference between liberal and conservative judges cannot be explained by the attitudinal model alone, since it suggests that ideology acts as a stronger filter for conservative judges than it does for liberal judges.
Discussion
Prior research on the U.S. Courts of Appeals has demonstrated that, rather than pitting law against ideology as an explanatory mechanism, elements of both factors play an important part in explaining judicial decision making (Klein 2002; Segal, Songer, and Cameron 1995) .
Much of the time, circuit court judges come to the same conclusion, liberal and conservative alike, perhaps because the law is often easily applied to many appeals-and also because the decision environment promotes consensual decision-making norms. On the other hand, the evidence shows that measures of judge ideology, both at the individual and panel level, are consistently significant predictors of voting behavior.
The findings described herein have important implications for the "attitudes versus law" debate among judicial scholars. While much of the work in this subfield has focused on modeling law as a uniform constraint, this study considers how the law matters from an information processing perspective. I argue that it is vital to consider the complexity of cases when making arguments about the relative power of law or ideology as explanatory mechanisms.
The results show that the effect of ideology as a "filter" grows increasingly stronger as case complexity increases, for all judges. However, conservative ideology is associated with a higher tendency to cast sincere votes at all levels of complexity, compared to liberal ideology. The lack of equivalence between the two groups is notable, given earlier work showing that Republican and Democratic judicial appointees are constrained differently by statutory language in criminal 21 case and employment cases. These findings underscore the importance of understanding the specific psychological mechanisms at work when we talk about ideology's role in judging, rather than relying upon "black box" accounts of judicial decision making.
xix Certainly, there are some limitations to this study that bear mentioning. Using the number of legal issues in the opinion without also having access to the accompanying briefs means that we are unable to observe issue suppression and other informal mechanisms that panels use to reach consensus when a case presents many elements. Indeed, some level of issue suppression is routine for judges, who regularly condense lengthy legal briefs with long lists of issues into relatively pithy opinions (Haire and Moyer 2008) . Unfortunately, most circuits do not make their briefs electronically available, and even in those circuits that do, access to briefs is gained only through a fee-based service called PACER. Future research should explore the role that these briefs play in judges' decision making in the federal appellate courts. Additionally, research should examine other possible operationalizations of a "legal issue": for example, to test whether the effects differ across merits and procedural issues.
The lively debate over judicial decision making will no doubt continue for many years to come. Nevertheless, scholars should continue to explore the nuances of both legal and psychological influences in order to gain a fuller understanding of the process of decision making, not just outcomes. Notes: **p < .01, *p < .05, two-tailed tests. Note: All continuous variables set at their median values. Dummy variables set at moderate judge, in the majority of the circuit, lower court decision not consistent with preferences, no U.S. government participation, and no dissent. Where the confidence intervals overlap, the difference in the probability between a moderate and an ideologically extreme judge are not statistically different from one another. Notes: **p < .01, *p < .05, two-tailed tests. All marginal effects and standard errors were calculated for all interaction terms, but the only statistically significant relationship was in Model 4b. This effect is graphed in Figure 3 . (Other graphs are omitted because of space.) Note: All continuous variables set at their median values. Dummy variables set at majority of the circuit, lower court decision not consistent with preferences, no U.S. government participation, and no dissent. Where the confidence intervals overlap, the difference in the probability between a moderate and an ideologically extreme judge are not statistically different from one another. ii This is also referred to in terms of "salience."
iii As a caveat, it should be noted that for judges in different institutional environments, some of the prerequisites for the behavior described by Segal and Spaeth are not satisfied. For instance, lower federal court judges and many state court judges have little or no say in choosing which cases they will hear. In addition, they may be motivated by ambition for higher judicial office, or constrained by the possibility of reversal by a higher court.
iv See Bartels (2009) for a newer strain of scholarship that acknowledges the role of both law and ideology in judicial decision making.
v The literature on political attitudes and behavior has also recognized that, in some situations, ideology is malleable, and might be issue-specific. However, I follow Jost et al. (2003, 342 fn2) in assuming that we can distinguish between a stable core of beliefs that are associated with individual ideology (e.g., preferences about change, inequality, and order) and attitudes on specific issues (e.g., crime).
vi The motivated reasoning account suggests a biased decision process, by which decision makers are predisposed to find authorities consistent with their ideological preferences more convincing than authorities that conflict with those preferences.
vii While the Supreme Court also operates by majority rule, substantially different norms exist in that institution about separate opinion writing. From 1950 to 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court maintained a dissent rate that was well above fifty percent (Haynie 1992), compared to a dissent rate of 7 percent on the Courts of Appeals during the same period (Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 2000) . As a result of the prevalence of consensus, the median judge on a Courts of Appeals panel yields more of an influence over her colleagues, in terms of the ideological direction of the court's opinion, than the median justice on the Supreme Court.
viii Yearly terminations on the merits is a preferable measure to total filings, since the latter does not signify whether the court considered the arguments and resolved the case in that year.
ix Interview with the author (December 2008).
x One limitation of using the headnotes variable is that it is truncated by the number of fields coded in the Songer database (the variable ranges from 0 to 7).
xi The substantive findings are robust to alternative specifications of the dependent variable in which a sincere vote is coded as a dichotomy based on the judge ideology scores, rather than party of appointing president. (See Appendix C.)
xii I also ran the models using a cross-sectional time-series analysis (Zorn 2001) . As the results of both methods were substantively equivalent, I report the logit results for ease of interpretation.
Another alternative specification would be to include fixed effects to control for circuit-specific tendencies. However, introducing these controls produces unacceptably high levels of collinearity with the Majority variable (>.90), so I opted not to include them.
xiii When the observations are separated by party of appointing president, 24 percent of all Democratic judge-votes were classified as coming from "extreme" judges, while 40 percent of all Republican judge-votes had this designation.
xiv This measure does not tap into the relative weight of each issue, or into the court's ruling on each issue. In addition, the dependent variable in the analysis is coded relative to the outcome of the entire case, so it is possible that in case with multiple issues, some, but not necessarily all, of these issues will have been decided consistent with the outcome of the case.
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xv The legal concepts were coded as part of the Multi-User database to reflect whether the court addressed the issue in a way that favored the appellant, the appellee, both (mixed decisions), or if the court did not address the issue at all. My coding scheme simply notes whether the court addressed the issue at all, regardless of which side prevailed and sums the number of issues addressed by the court in its majority opinion.
xvi When the value for Lower Court is set at 1, the probability of sincere voting for liberal and conservative judges increase dramatically, reflecting the powerful effect of this control variable.
Liberal judges' probabilities range from .91 to .92 (compared to .35 to .39 when Lower Court is equal to 0), while a conservative judge goes from .98 to .99 (compared to .62 -.65). After Legal Complexity exceeds 3, the differences between liberal and conservative judges are no longer statistically different from one another.
xvii Supplemental analyses were also conducted using only civil rights and liberties cases, since ideology may be more salient in such cases. However, the substantive findings remain largely the same. The only difference is that the Extreme weakens in statistical significance from p < .001 to p < .10.
xviii When the models are estimated without the interaction terms, Legal Complexity fails to reach conventional levels of significance, and the results largely mirror the findings in Table 1. xix This is not to say that liberal or conservative judges consciously rely on shortcuts in the place of legal arguments, or that they are simply trying to decide cases quickly without regard to the quality of their work; indeed, there is ample evidence that judges value and strive to produce high quality legal work every time a case comes before them.
